This research explores why locally based Islamist militant groups, on occasion, tend to be unaffiliated or at best, loosely connected with broader transnational militant Islamist organizations such as Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This is an intriguing empirical puzzle given the extent of linkages that a vast multitude of localized Jihadists have forged with global/regional Jihadi counterparts such as Al-Qaeda. Using the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) -a militant Islamist group operating in the Ugandan-Congolese borderland, as a detailed case study, this research investigates the conditions under which significant linkages with transnational Islamists are less likely.
The formation, durability and characteristics of alliances between terrorist groups have been the subjects of considerable academic scrutiny. 1 In particular, many studies have explored the nature of alliance patterns between militant Islamist organizations with much research focused on the interaction between Al-Qaeda and its various affiliates. 2 In a similar vein, this study limits itself to an examination of the relations (or lack thereof) between militant groups based on an Islamic ideology. This is primarily motivated by the preeminence of Al-Qaeda and its impressive array of ties with regional Islamists. Moreover, ISIS has rapidly emerged as a significant challenger to Al-Qaeda with a growing number of local and regional militant outfits pledging allegiance to the group. Given this context of ever expanding transnational ties, it is opportune to investigate why some militant Islamists do not develop links with one another. The study is further limited to groups espousing a broad Salafi Jihadist ideology. Such groups subscribe to a pious form of Islam, generally consonant with its early ancestors. Salafi Jihadists aim to return Islam to its pristine glory, overthrow apostate regimes, condemn non-conformists and eradicate detrimental outside influences. 3 The focus on such movements is warranted given the 58% increase in the number of Salafi-Jihadist groups from 2010-13. 4 Restricting the study exclusively to Salafist groups also allows for greater conceptual clarity and facilitates making relevant generalizations.
The authors contend that in order to explain the absence of ties between some militant Islamist organizations, it is helpful to delineate the circumstances conducive to the development of such ties, in the first place. Studies show that alliances are more likely when a partnership confers mutual benefits to both parties. For instance, transnationals like Al-Qaeda gain by getting a wider platform to export their ideology and being offered safe havens in areas controlled by local militants. Locals, on the other hand, benefit through improved training, military experience, financial/logistical assistance and greater name recognition. As discussed later, there is much heterogeneity in the scope and strength of relations between local Islamists and their more transnational partners. Theorizing such variation (which ranges from official affiliation to vaguely suspected ties) is also useful for understanding why alliance patterns may be tenuous or non-existent in some cases. The strength of inter-Islamist linkages is contingent on myriad different factors. These include the extent of ideological incompatibility, the degree of salience to the local community and other relevant actors and apprehension at being a more visible target of counter-terrorist operations.
Based on the foregoing theoretical summary and an in-depth examination of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), this study advances the argument that meaningful linkages between the ADF and transnational Islamist movements such as Al-Qaeda or ISIS are unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future. First, while the ADF retains a nominally Salafi outlook, the importance accorded to an Islamist agenda in practice is ambiguous, at best. The ADF has been labeled as multi-layered and comprising of several disparate factions with varied grievances and agendas and there is no clear evidence that an extremist Jihadist agenda overrides ADF's worldview. 5 Further, the ADF is presently active in an area that has less than 10% Muslim population and has very little history of radicalism. Hence, the ADF is unlikely to advance the ideological prerogatives of global Jihadists. Second, in spite of its Ugandan origins, the ADF has long been embedded in eastern Congolese society through extensive involvement in the economy and the informal trans-border trade, intermarriage and similar cultural traits. This has facilitated ADF's immersion into the larger Congolese conflict, provided collaborative opportunities with other rebel groups in the area and boosted the recruitment of Congolese non-Muslims into their ranks.
The coexistence between the ADF and the local community, while being uneasy at times and punctuated with occasional civilian abuses by the ADF, has generally prevailed due to mutual interests. However, this relationship has sharply deteriorated since early 2013 as the ADF carried out numerous attacks against the civilian population in its area of operations. Given this context of rapidly worsening ties, an entrenched relationship with transnational Islamists could further aggravate tensions and is unlikely to resonate favorably with the local community. Third, the Ugandan government has often portrayed the ADF as an agent of Al-Qaeda in order to justify crackdowns and muster international support. Hence, more visible ties with external Islamist militants will likely invite ADF more attention from the Ugandan authorities as well as other regional/global actors. Therefore, the fear of attracting new enemies may serve as an effective deterrent against the development of robust linkages, particularly in light of the seemingly limited utility of an alliance.
Forging Salafi Jihadist alliances
A survey of the literature reveals that Al-Qaeda has undergone a dramatic transformation in recent times. Beginning in the 1990s, Al-Qaeda has actively sought to expand its international reach by building alliances with militant Islamist groups around the world. 26 The ADF, in fact, has capitalized on such factors and formed sporadic alliances with several rebel outfits in the DRC. 27 However, crucially, not one of these partnerships has been with a militant Islamist group.
Third, it is opportune to study the ADF more closely as the group has increasingly been in the spotlight recently. After being quiescent for some time, the ADF carried out a series of devastating attacks on civilians in the DRC over the last two years and became embroiled in sustained fighting with the Congolese army. 28 Furthermore, the group has been accused of killing Muslim clergy members in Uganda in early 2015. 29 This recent escalation in ADF militancy has reignited interest in the group and raised questions whether the surge in violence is linked to assistance/influence from other Jihadist groups.
Theorizing terrorist networks
Before addressing why the ADF has not cultivated linkages with other militant Islamists, it is imperative to engage in a theoretical discussion on the nature of terrorist alliances. Two A strategic partnership between a locally based militant Islamist group and a transnational Islamist movement is more likely when there is a symbiotic relationship between partners. Both parties may gain from ideological congruence, aggregation of resources/capabilities and operational specialization, among others. 30 The following discussion explores the specific parameters of this synergy.
Benefit to transnational Islamists
Groups like Al-Qaeda encourages supporters to wage a holy Jihad against those that it perceives as enemies of Islam. Specifically, the United States and other Western allies are believed to be a waging a global conspiracy against Islam with the aim of marginalizing the wider Muslim community. 31 Al Qaeda needs to expand its global franchise for myriad different reasons. First, affiliation affords Al-Qaeda an excellent opportunity to propagate its doctrine to an ever wider audience. 32 Second, as Al-Qaeda's ideology reaches a wider audience, there has been an increase in affiliate groups willing to carry out acts of Jihad, at local, regional and global levels. 33 In particular, some affiliates have shown an increasing propensity to target Western interests. 34 Third, in a post 9/11 context, with Al-Qaeda at the receiving end of stringent and ongoing counter-terrorism measures, the group increasingly found itself under siege. In this context, alliance building has enabled the group to sustain its mission and to a certain extent, its operations. 35 Fourth, cultivating strategic partnerships is crucial given Al-Qaeda's lack of 
Benefit to local Islamists
Local militants benefit from accreditation with transnational groups through the training of combatants, emulation of tactics and the provision of financial and logistical support. A number of Al-Shabaab training camps in Somalia were conducted by foreigners with close connections to Al-Qaeda. 39 In a similar vein, Lashkar-e-Taiba, AQAP and Boko Haram militants received training in camps controlled by Al-Qaeda or affiliates. In such camps, local militants are instructed on strategies ranging from suicide bombing to guerilla warfare and exposed to sophisticated weaponry, which often leads to the transplanting of such tactics in the local theatre. 40 Al-Qaeda's vast recruitment network has also enabled local Jihadists to attract foreign fighters to their cause. 41 In some cases, local militants team up with foreign Jihadists when they face setbacks such as military defeat or loss of recruitment and thus, in need of fortification. Nigeria, India and Mali (rather than the United States) respectively as their primary adversary. 47 There is also much disagreement on the extent of Islamic governance that Jihadists envision. Al- 52 In some cases, the Al-Qaeda core has also been concerned about the excessively violent tendencies of certain affiliates and urged groups such as the AQI and the Pakistan Taliban (TTP) to be more discriminate in target selection. 53 Moderate Salafi groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood rejects violence "outside of carefully defined domains"
and has unequivocally denounced the 9/11 attacks as well as other violent incidents carried out by Al-Qaeda and affiliates. 54 The extent of engagement with existing political institutions has also caused discord Jihadists more concerned with local issues. 59 Haynes argues that a sustained nexus between local and foreign Islamists is unlikely in the East African region. For centuries, East African
Muslims have been apolitical (in matters of religion) and followed a "relatively liberal and mystical brand of Islam" far removed from the radical version championed by global Jihadists.
Even in Muslim majority Zanzibar, with its litany of grievances, groups that seek a more Islamic agenda have chosen to do so through negotiation and discussion. 60 Embracing a more global agenda represents an opportunity cost for local militants in that it takes away resources that could be devoted towards more parochial objectives. This, in turn, can lead to cracks in the Jihadi network. For instance, while participation in elections might threaten the ideological purity of global Jihadists, local Jihadists perceive them as a gilt-edged opportunity to defend and better their communities. 61 Similarly, tensions arose within AlShabaab and Ansar Dine, as factions in each group sought to maintain dialogue and engagement with their respective national governments in spite of pressure from Al -Qaeda and AQIM to sever ties. 62 Groups such as AQAP and Al-Nusra became more cognizant of the need to continue the provision of social services to locals to secure their support even as they came under increasing influence from foreign Islamists with different priorities. 63 Partnership with global Jihadists can attract more foreign fighters to a local cause;
however their strict adherence to a global agenda and lack of familiarity with indigenous mores can estrange local supporters. The presence of foreigners in the higher echelons of Al-Shabaab and forced marriages to foreign fighters were resented by many Somalis. 64 Puritanical practices of foreign Islamists often leading to the brutalization of the local Sufi population and the destruction of venerated cultural symbols were deeply despised by local communities in Mali, 65 Afghanistan 66 and Somalia. 67 Issue salience is also pertinent for the Al-Qaeda core. Affiliation poses the risk of contaminating Al-Qaeda's ideological brand as the group wrestles with the diverse agendas of local Jihadists. Two cases from the southern Philippines are instructive. First, the Abu Sayyaf
Group increasingly fell out of favor with Al-Qaeda as the former changed its focus from embracing global Jihad to banditry and criminal activity. 68 Second, the MILF's continued dalliance with the infidel Philippine state proved ideologically unpalatable to Al-Qaeda. 69 For a Jihadist relationship to be robust, a balance has to be struck between global and local agendas. The AQAP has seemingly balanced this dual agenda better than most. 70 It has done so by carrying out high profile attacks abroad while at the same time being able to effectively channel local grievances. The group has emphasized the inviolable sanctity of tribal land, played on longstanding tribal fears of outside influence and used such notions to justify their attacks. 71 Further, as Loidolt notes, AQAP has categorically linked its goals to widely held grievances against the Yemeni government; namely, corruption, political oppression and its lack of Islamic credentials. Such strategic "packaging" of its agenda has enabled the group to maintain salience amongst the local population.
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Fear of attracting new enemies
One notable downside of cultivating visible links with global Jihadists is that local
Islamists could attract considerable scrutiny from law enforcement authorities. Particularly, in the midst of a concerted global campaign against terrorism, conspicuous ties with groups such as Al-Qaeda or ISIS increase the possibility of a local Jihadist group being subject to more stringent counter-terrorism measures. The likelihood of attracting new adversaries may serve as a deterrent as local groups ponder the pros and cons of a transnational alliance. 73 Some sources suggest that Al-Shabaab delayed officially aligning with Al-Qaeda as it feared more attention from Western counter-terrorism organizations. 74 Declassified documents captured from the Abbottabad raid that led to the death of bin Laden suggests that the former AlQaeda leader discouraged Al-Shabaab from a formal union as it would encourage greater "enemy" mobilization against Somalia. 75 After a period of relative dormancy, interspersed with occasional bouts of violence, 91 there has been a significant resurgence in ADF activity over the last two years. A series of devastating attacks on civilians in the eastern DRC has been blamed on the ADF. 92 people through false promises of free education, employment and business opportunities. 102 The group has also recruited a considerable number of child soldiers. 103 In the late 1990s, at its peak, ADF-NALU cadres numbered an estimated 4,000-5,000. 104 According to Ugandan authorities and UN sources, the ADF had an estimated strength between 1,200 and 1,500 fighters in late
2013
. 105 This drop in numbers is partly attributable to the breakup of the ADF-NALU alliance in 2007 and is also influenced by recent military offensives in the Rwenzori borderland.
The ADF has access to multiple sources of financing. The group maintains an extensive business network mainly concentrated in Congolese towns such as Butembo, Beni and Oiche in North Kivu, but also extending to areas in Uganda and Rwanda. The militants rely on this network for funding, cross-border trading and the timely provision of material support such as food, clothing and medicine to ADF training camps. 106 Businesses controlled by the ADF range from pharmacies to motorcycle taxi companies and to stores selling a variety of retail goods; such interactions make it easier for the group to embed itself in the local economy. 107 Some ADF members engage in agricultural activity and trade their produce in the local market. 108 The harvesting of timber and coffee in areas of control is a particularly lucrative avenue of raising funds. The group has in place an elaborate system of taxation for those who harvest timber. The aforementioned business networks are often instrumental in illegally exporting timber and coffee to Uganda. Some sources also suggest that the ADF has controlled small gold mines in the area. 109 Moreover, the movement allegedly receives funding through international money transfers from Kenya, Tanzania and the UK. The emergence and entrenchment of the ADF in the Rwenzori borderland has to be considered in the context of the above geopolitical crises. Before long, the ADF-NALU alliance became "part and parcel of a growing regional war complex." 114 The increasing lack of state control in eastern Congo expanded the geographic space available to the ADF. The multitude of armed actors on the ground led to constantly shifting alliances and provided the ADF with scope to forge opportunistic alliances with various armed groups in the region such as the Hutu
Interahamwe and the Mai-Mai militias. 115 Such coalitions were motivated at times by practical reasons and at other times by political imperatives.
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Explaining ADF's lack of ties with other Islamists
As discussed earlier, whether or not a relationship develops and sustains between Islamist militant groups is predicated on several factors. These include the extent of ideological divergence, degree of relevance to the local community and the fear of attracting new enemies.
In the case of the ADF, each of these factors is highly relevant in understanding why meaningful ties between the group and other Jihadists have not materialized.
Importance of Islamic ideology in the ADF
The ADF is associated with the Salaf Tabligh sect and often labeled as a militant Islamist movement by the Ugandan authorities. Moreover, many academic and policy reports also describe the ADF through a primarily Islamist lens. 117 As previously mentioned, Mukulu is a strong adherent of Salafi thought and has expressed his desire to establish an Islamist state in Uganda. The 2015 report by the UN panel of experts on the DRC reveals that the ADF carried out Islamic instruction in its training camps, utilized a legal system based on the Koran and forcefully converted its abductees to Islam. Indeed, failure to convert was often punishable by death. 118 Moreover, Hellyer observes that Muslim women in the ADF camps that she visited increasingly wore more conservative attire. 119 The above description provides a brief snapshot of the Islamic character of the ADF.
However, Scorgie-Porter argues forcefully that an exclusive focus on the religious aspect In a similar vein, the ADF has been described as a multi-layered entity comprising several different elements with varying agendas. While the Tabligh network has served a vital role in recruitment and was largely responsible for securing funds from multiple Islamic charities and foreign countries during the formative stages of ADF's existence, the group is considerably less reliant on the Tabligh now for recruitment and particularly for funding. Recruitment in the ADF has also been heavily contingent on non-religious factors such as the exploitation of deepseated perceptions of marginalization, poverty and the lack of alternative opportunity in the Rwenzori borderland. As described earlier, ADF's economic embeddedness in the local community provides the group with its primary avenues of funding and material support at present and the group's financial contributions from Islamic sources have considerably dwindled over time. Some sources do suggest that elements of Al-Qaeda had sporadic ties with the ADF in the 1990s and provided some financial assistance. 127 Reportedly, bin Laden even met Mukulu while they were both in Sudan in the early 1990s. It is apparent that a hardcore Salafi Jihadist agenda is not the exclusive focus of the ADF.
Not a single attack attributed to the ADF in the last two years has been against the "far enemy" and the group operates in an area with little history of Islamic extremism and littered with a potpourri of insurgent movements with no interest in furthering Jihadist goals. Hence, it is not surprising that the group has not cultivated deep ties with foreign Jihadists. Mukulu's pending extradition from Tanzania and a likely long jail sentence in Uganda will soon necessitate a change in leadership. Unless the new leaders dramatically change course, the present ideological gulf will preclude the ADF from forging meaningful alliances with global and regional Jihadists.
Salience to local community
Empirical evidence suggests that an alliance between foreign and local Jihadists is more likely to sustain if it resonates with the needs and objectives of the local population. In the case of the ADF, the group has become increasingly integrated with the local community in the eastern Congo and undergone a gradual process of "Congolization." The ADF developed an extensive commercial network that allowed it to exploit the vibrant cross-border informal trade that connects many Ugandan and Congolese communities. This includes the establishment of ties with both Ugandan and Congolese government and military officials to facilitate the transfer of resources out of the DRC and into the regional and, ultimately, global markets. 131 The relative absence of state control on both sides of the border facilitated free movement of goods and people. In essence, a parallel economy emerged that has maintained the financial viability of the ADF, contributed to the economic life of the region and introduced a semblance of cohabitation between the ADF and the local population.
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Cultural affinity between the Bakonjo in western Uganda and the Banande in eastern DRC allowed ADF fighters to feel "they were within their own community" amongst the Banande. 133 Moreover, high rates of inter-marriage expedited the pace of "Congolization." In particular, many Ugandan born children of ADF fighters, who fled with their parents to eastern DRC in the 1990s, have married Congolese citizens. 134 Today, the majority of ADF members are
Congolese and it is difficult to conceive of the movement as "Ugandan" or "foreign." 135 Further, the local Muslim community has generally been supportive to the ADF and provided places of worship and opportunities for recruitment and financing.
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The prevailing conflict environment in the DRC led to a proliferation of rebel movements in the region; this, allied with the ADF's socio-economic embeddedness in the local community, provided the group with a "bountiful supply of potential partners in crime." 137 ADF increased its violence against civilians, local assistance has been harder to obtain and the group has resorted to more coercive and brutal methods to maintain its influence in the region. 143 As one scholar noted, "people are being punished and killed when they don't want to collaborate" with the ADF. 144 The foregoing summary of ADF's relations with locals in eastern Congo is important to understand why any potential collaboration between the ADF and foreign Islamist militants is unlikely to be welcomed by the local community. As previously noted, preference divergence obstructs the meaningful development of robust ties between local and global Jihadists. Given ADF's history of forging opportunistic ties with militants in eastern Congo, one may wonder whether the group may contemplate a similar dalliance with one or more Jihadist groups active in Africa. Although such a possibility cannot be ruled out, it is unlikely that the relationship would endure, even if it were to emerge. Further, as Scorgie points out, while the ADF interacted with various militant forces in the region, they "by no means 'swallowed' them to make one homogeneous group." The numerous groups operating in the region have been able to maintain their own independent identity, ideology and modus operandi even as they coordinated with each other on attacks and training. 147 For instance, there is little evidence that the ADF attempted to impose its Salafist ideology on its former colleagues in NALU. In contrast, it is doubtful whether the ADF would be afforded a similar level of autonomy were they to form an alliance with foreign Jihadists given the latter's unrelenting focus on a global agenda.
Fear of attracting new enemies
Affiliation with global Jihadists is likely to be less alluring to groups such as the ADF, Finally, more verifiable ties with external Islamist militants will likely invite ADF more attention from the Ugandan authorities as well as other regional/global actors. Therefore, the fear
